Kuhn and the Nature of Normal Science
by Matt Stoltz, 2005
Thomas Kuhn's discourse on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions can easily be misunderstood if a reader is not fully aware of the apposite language that Kuhn utilizes. Kuhn's application of terms are unique to the book and, at times, do not exactly adhere to their semantic heritage. The purpose of this essay is two-fold; first, it will show where and how a reader can be lead astray, then it will demonstrate what is actually being claimed and all the implications and assumptions that follow. It will focus on chapter III "The Nature of Normal Science," but will travel outside of the chapter to substantiate the ideas behind some of Kuhn's terms.
The section finds its entry point through two important questions which must be understood in the context of the book if a reader is to fully understand them. The first question essentially asks, 'what does a paradigm consider appropriate research for a scientific community to be based on itself' (23). Taken out of context, a reader might mistakenly ask himself "Wait a minute, what is this paradigm, and why does it have control over the actions of scientists?" The follow up question asks 'If the paradigm represents work that has been done, then what problems could possibly be left for a group to resolve" (23)? This question contains a fundamentally confusing element in italics, namely, it is an inversion of the expected application of the term paradigm. Traditionally, a common usage of the term paradigm would be when X represents the paradigm of Y. In short, the passive reader would say to himself, 'Shouldn't the work represent the paradigm?' If a reader does not understand how these questions are presented, then he should not proceed; rather, he should go back to page ten where the two crucial terms normal science and paradigm are defined. These questions are a prelude that imply exactly what Kuhn is trying to solve, namely, the nature of normal science or, moreover, the behavior we can expect from a scientific community practicing normal science from any given paradigm.
Now that we have imagined the trajectory of a passive reader's perception of the initial questions, let us estimate where an active reader's perception might be. Granted, such a reader is familiar with the application of the aforementioned terms and probably heard the prelude as well, he would then be in a position to anticipate where Kuhn is taking his argument. But first, it is necessary to note the last two sentences of the first paragraph, "In a science, on the other hand, a paradigm is rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions" (23). For the active reader this will make perfect sense only after reading the next two paragraphs. Initially, any reader taking this passage out of context might anticipate Kuhn portraying a scientific community constrained by stringent commitments to the paradigm guiding their research. This is a harsh-and altogether fallible-anticipation, for if this were the case the implication that scientists are accomplishing little would exist. However, this implication will not endure much further than the next two paragraphs because Kuhn clarifies that practicing normal science is not only the most rewarding and engaging aspect for scientists, but it is also how science moves forward within its own paradigm. In short, scientists fortify the paradigm by practicing normal science which aims to clean up any residue of doubt that may exist, and while doing so the paradigm will be articulated further.
At this point, Kuhn begins to describe some of the behavior of normal science. A reader must consider the following statements, "No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of phenomena...Nor do scientists normally aim to invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those invented by others", if he wants to understand the behavior of normal science. Kuhn is not saying that normal science isn't innovative; rather he is saying that the paradigm itself provides scientists with the imaginative tools needed to extend the paradigm. These restrictions may seem to limit the scope of research-which they do indeed- but the reader cannot forget how, like a microscope, it allows the scientists to see much deeper into the paradigm that has won a group's confidence. Kuhn continually emphasizes the idea that a group's confidence in a paradigm is required for any practice or development to occur. For example, he says "...during the period when the paradigm is successful, the profession will have solved problems that its members could scarcely have imagined and would never have undertaken without commitment to the paradigm" (24/25). After this statement, any reader, passive or active should be asking themselves 'what does he mean by a successful paradigm?' The first five paragraphs serve as a foundation that builds up to this question of a successful paradigm, and Kuhn argues that it is normal science which determines its success.
A reader's attention should be aroused at the end of the fifth paragraph because it marks the point where Kuhn starts to gather evidence for his premises. In this paragraph the reader is confronted with another series of questions that ask: 'what do scientists normally choose to report on? What determines that choice? And, what motivates scientists to pursue that choice all the way to a conclusion?' From here, the active reader can again anticipate the direction of Kuhn's argument, which is to illustrate the process or behavior that normal science follows. However, the passive reader would still be reconciling terms. At this point in the chapter the passive reader will be wading in so many semantic question marks that we can now eliminate him completely from our discussion because he can no longer survive; if the anteceding paragraphs were not understood than the following anecdotes would be meaningless. Furthermore, if this is the case he might as well put the whole damn book down because this central to the discourse as a whole.
Kuhn proceeds to admit much of his evidence by describing what he calls the "three normal foci for factual scientific research investigation " (25). This indicates for us that Kuhn will present three types of scientific experimentation which will converge on normal science. The first class of experimentation that the paradigm breeds are those which reveal the nature of things in certain ways. A reader should note that this class of experimentation affects the practitioners of normal science because they provide motivation to increase the 'accuracy and scope' of their experiments. He provides convincing examples from astronomy, physics, and chemistry. Also, Kuhn claims that scientists who have gained great reputations did so not from any novelty of their research, but rather from 'predetermining, with more precision, previously known facts' (26). This sentence is important because it prepares the reader for the next chapter on puzzle solving, and also reaches backwards to the passage describing normal science being intolerant of new theory.
The second class of experiments all aim to compare nature with paradigm theory. Kuhn warns us that there is usually a margin of error whenever paradigm theory attempts to predict nature, and it is in this class of facts where a scientist must utilize his skill and imagination to find experiments that can decrease that margin. Anyone in our class should take special heed to the words skill and imagination and recognize that it is not the 'normal scientist' who is guiding his imagination and skill in these experiments, but rather the paradigm. At the same time, however, a student in our class should be cautious not to make the erroneous inference that these normal scientists lack skill and imagination in general, that is not what Kuhn is implying; the claim only applies once normal science is being practiced by the scientist, anything beyond this would be outside the scope of this text. This paragraph prepares us for a later connection that Kuhn will establish in which the expected agreement between paradigm theory and paradigm application becomes limited by required approximations. From there, Kuhn gives examples of 'special apparatuses' that were constructed for the purpose of increasing agreement between nature and paradigm theory. This piece of evidence transitions into the central issue of the paragraph which Kuhn asserts as being, "That attempt to demonstrate agreement is a second type of normal experimental work, and it is even more obviously dependent than the first upon a paradigm" (27). Kuhn is saying that no experiment of this sort, with the aid of a special apparatus, would ever proceed under normal science without a scientist's full investment and confidence in the paradigm.
Lastly, the third class of experimentation articulates paradigm theory by cleaning up any left over ambiguities that may exist. A reader must identify when Kuhn says "...its description demands its subdivision" because the next two paragraphs are still dealing with this class of experimentation. First, Kuhn describes mathematical science and claims that it aims to determine physical constants. Using Newton as his chief piece of evidence, Kuhn describes how normal science has striven to improve the gravitational constant. Of course, one should not loose sight of the more subtle underlying argument through these specific pieces of evidence, Kuhn is talking about universal constants, laws, and principles that we have all studied in our educational careers. The most vital ideas that a reader must obtain in this paragraph are that this class of experimentation takes up the majority of work within normal science, and that these experiments 'would not be carried out unless a paradigm theory defined the problem and guaranteed the existence of a stable solution' (28).
The next paragraph claims that normal science does not merely stop at this class of experimentation seeking to determine universal constants, but goes further yet through quantification. Kuhn is saying that once these universal constants become articulated scientists try to bridge relationships between constants to extend paradigm articulation further. A reader should be very careful in this paragraph because Kuhn relaxes from his argument for just a moment and injects a hypothetical statement; if that statement is taken out of context the results could be disastrous. He says that 'maybe a paradigm is not required for quantification...we often hear how they manifest of their own accord without any theoretical commitments' (28). If this is the case Kuhn's argument would be severely weakened, but the next sentence (which should also provide subtle humor to anyone familiar with Bacon) claims that history provides no support for such 'excessively Baconian a method' (28). In the end, Kuhn postulates that quantitative laws arise through paradigm articulation.
Kuhn's final subdivision of the third class includes qualitative experimentation. In this paragraph Kuhn describes how experiments of this sort consist largely of exploration. Consequently, and more relevant to the entire book, Kuhn hints that exploration of this kind is more prevalent in periods that are concerned with the quality of nature's regularity. This statement foreshadows the problem of the anomaly and can help to contextualize normal science once Kuhn gets there. The apex in this paragraph is that qualitative experiments attempt to reduce the ambiguity that closely related sets of phenomena create by exploring different modes of experimenting which will clean up any residue of ambiguity. Kuhn's supporting evidence is caloric theory, and its ambiguity in accounting for state changes (of heat) was resolved by the introduction of a vacuum which could isolate all the variables. The overall purpose of these paragraphs about the three classes of experiments is to show the reader the empirical problems which normal science attempts to solve, and the reader should accomplish a sense of normal scientific behavior from them.
At this point in the chapter, Kuhn shifts to the theoretical problems of normal science. There are two paragraphs that slowly build up to the problem of precision in normal theoretical work. Before Kuhn approaches that problem he gives us a broad look at the behavior of normal theoretical work. One of which acts to utilize old theory to predict facts that have intrinsic worth, the other seeks to "develop points of contact between theory and nature" (30). A reader needs to understand that the task of theory is still committed to the paradigm; it is not trying to reach beyond it like the verb to theorize might suggest. Kuhn makes it clear that all theoretical endeavors aim at demonstrating new applications of the paradigm or aim at increasing its precision. Whenever Kuhn uses Newton as an example, a non-science reader should increase his awareness because Newton, despite any non-scientific background, is one of the most inclusive examples throughout the text, and Kuhn takes us right through the end of the chapter with him. Through Kuhn's examples a reader can easily get a sense of the successor's role; Kepler left Newton with enough distance between nature and theory to go out and demonstrate a new more precise application of the paradigm, and the same holds true for Newton's successors. Kuhn uses the term 'ad hoc assumptions' and it is incredibly important to understand the implications of it. If a reader depends on some phonetically conceived definition of the term, like a hoax assumption, than he will miss what Kuhn is saying. Kuhn is saying that assumptions are made by normal theoretical scientists with specific purposes in mind and all the conclusions proceed from there. These kinds of assumptions (and assumptions in general) can generate a lot of future work for scientists because it gives them a point of further articulation.
The problem of precision takes up the rest of the chapter. Kuhn initiates the problem by illuminating a parallel between the aforementioned 'special apparatus' found on the empirical half of his argument and the theoretical side found here. He is saying that normal theoreticians behave similarly in their thought experiments and 'in order to provide unique definitions' approximations must be made. To pause for a moment, a reader from our class should understand the significance of Kuhn's claim that both theory and experiment behave in similar respects under the conditions of normal science. This was seen in Bacon, Kant, and now Kuhn who have all ardently worked at bridging the two. Anyway, back to Kuhn, just like the normal empiricist the normal theorist too affects the outcome of expected agreement simply by making these approximations. Kuhn sites Newton ignoring the effect of air resistance in many of his pendulum theorems, which only created limited agreement between Newton's predictions and the actual experiment. A corresponding resultant of this is expressed again in a chief underlying argument that can be identified once Kuhn states "...these limitations of agreement left many fascinating theoretical problems for Newton's successors" (32). Furthermore, Kuhn hints at how little the actual agreement between paradigm theory and paradigm application must be for scientists to adhere to, and also articulate, the paradigm; this is useful to know for later chapters that deal with the role of persuasion and how groups debate over the validity of paradigms.
One of the final thoughts that Kuhn argues about normal science is the idea of clarification by reformulation. He says that it affects the nature of the paradigm in such ways as to make it more 'logically and aesthetically satisfying.' He is saying that such scientists who participate in this mode of inquiry desire the paradigm to display a more acute sense of logic and coherence than before. This, in turn, would fortify the paradigm from impending doubt and aid in winning the minds of future scientists in the field of normal research. It may seem only to expound what has already been said, but it is not. Indeed it belongs to the same train of thought as cleaning up any existing residual ambiguities (after all, that's what it is essentially doing), but clarification by reformulation increases the precision of an existing paradigm to a far greater extent than some of the other avenues of practicing normal science do. In the end, Kuhn assures his audience that theory and fact work hand in hand at solving the problems of normal science. He concludes that experimentation on the part of both paradigm theory and paradigm application is where "the literature of normal science (34)" lay. And, at this point in the chapter Kuhn is pretty much finished discussing the nature of normal science. However, he ends by introducing a series of concepts that reach towards many other chapters. For instance, he mentions extraordinary problems found in science, extraordinary problems that can only be prepared by normal science, and transitions into the next chapter about normal science as puzzle-solving. With this in mind, a reader should understand just how important this chapter on the nature of normal science was in terms of the book as a whole. One must know the nature of normal science to know Kuhn's theses.
So what is a successful paradigm according to Kuhn? Generally speaking, if we consider the questions from which Kuhn proceeded, then it appears to be an aspect of nature that scientists are committed to report on which at the same time motivates them to pursue that nature all the way to its conclusions. In the same vein, this is exactly what constitutes the nature of normal scientific behavior on both the theoretical and empirical extremes, namely, striving to get nature to conform to the paradigm. A successful paradigm seduces scientists to follow a path of normal science so that this can be achieved. From there, articulation can proceed to its furthest possible extent. As we have seen, the problems in normal science spring from the paradigm and generate the majority of its labor, as well as intrinsically excite its primary aims.